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Abstract
In this paper, I clarify the relation between two types of grounding: metaphysical and
conceptual. Metaphysical grounding relates entities at more and less fundamental
ontological levels. Conceptual grounding relates semantically primitive sentences
and semantically derivative sentences. It is important to distinguish these relations
given that both types of grounding can underwrite non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims.
In this paper, I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if
a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve
metaphysical grounding. I then present two heuristics for deciding which type of
grounding is relevant to a given case. These heuristics suggest that certain proposed
cases of metaphysical grounding may not actually involve metaphysical grounding
at all.
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1 Introduction
Recently, many theorists have claimed that the world has an ordered, hierarchical struc-
ture. Entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically ground entities at
higher ontological levels.1 It has also recently been claimed that our language has an
ordered, hierarchical structure. Semantically primitive sentences are said to conceptually
ground less primitive sentences.2 It is often emphasized that metaphysical grounding is
a relation between things out in the world, not a relation between our sentences. But I
will argue that not enough care has been taken to distinguish these two types of ground-
1See, e.g., Schaffer (2009), Audi (2012a).
2See Chalmers (2012, 452-460).
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ing. Conflating these relations is easy to do, given that both types of grounding are
expressed by non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims.
In section 2, I will argue that there are indeed two distinct grounding relations ex-
pressed by non-causal “in-virtue of” claims. In sections 3-4, I will argue that conceptual
and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves concep-
tual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. In section 5, I will give
some heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant in a given case. These
heuristics suggest that many proposed cases of metaphysical grounding may not involve
metaphysical grounding at all. I will conclude by explaining why these results should
interest both supporters and detractors of the study of metaphysical grounding.
2 Distinct types of grounding
I will begin by describing metaphysical and conceptual grounding and the explanatory
work each is supposed to perform.
2.1 Metaphysical grounding
I will follow the common strategy of introducing metaphysical grounding with examples:3
1. The fact that there are chemicals arranged in a certain way obtains in virtue of the fact
that there are particles arranged in a certain way.
2. {Socrates} exists in virtue of the fact that Socrates exists.
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of its having shape R.4
4. x is fragile in virtue of its molecular arrangement and the physical laws.
5. x’s action is wrong in virtue of its being done with the sole motive to cause harm.
6. x is in pain in virtue of the fact that x is in brain state P .
3For ease of presentation, I have adjusted these examples to give them a common form. The examples
are from (in order): Schaffer (2012, 125), Fine (1995, 271), Schaffer (2012, 126), Rosen (2010, 110), Fine
(2012b, 1), and Clark & Liggins (2012, 812).
4Here, R is a certain shape falling under the determinable being roughly spherical In [6], P is a brain
state realizing conscious state of pain..
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For example, [3] is said to correspond to a metaphysical grounding relation between
the fact x’s having shape R and the fact x’s being roughly spherical.
These examples have an important role in the literature because they are supposed
to provide us with an intuitive grip on the notion of metaphysical grounding.5 They
are also used to motivate two types of explanatory work that metaphysical grounding is
supposed to perform. First, metaphysical grounding is supposed to underwrite cases of
metaphysical explanation. For example, in [1], we explain the fact that there are chemi-
cals arranged in a certain way by appealing to the fact that there are particles arranged
in a certain way. It is claimed that, just as we need the causal relation to underwrite
cases of causal explanation, so too we need metaphysical grounding to underwrite cases
of metaphysical explanation.6
Second, metaphysical grounding is posited to accommodate intuitions about meta-
physical priority.7 For example, it intuitively seems that the individual Socrates is more
fundamental than the singleton set {Socrates}. But we cannot accommodate this intu-
ition using familiar tools like supervenience, since Socrates and {Socrates} supervene on
each other. Accordingly, it has been argued that metaphysical grounding is needed to
capture the fine-grainedness of metaphysical priority.8
For ease of presentation, I will adopt two assumptions about metaphysical ground-
ing. First, I will assume the common view that metaphysical grounding relates facts
(i.e., obtaining states of affairs).9 Facts are individuated by the objects and properties
composing them. Second, I will assume that metaphysical grounding is unitary, i.e., that
there is a single dependence relation corresponding to all cases of metaphysical expla-
5For discussion, see Schaffer (2009, 375-376).
6See Audi (2012a, 687-688) for this view. One might instead say that metaphysical grounding is just
identical to metaphysical explanation (see Trogdon (2013, section 3) for discussion). The distinction
between these views will not be relevant to the arguments ahead.
7See Clark & Liggins (2012, 813).
8It is commonly supposed that metaphysical grounding straightforwardly implies supervenience. But
see Leuenberger (2013) and Skiles (2014) for more nuanced discussion.
9See, e.g., Rosen (2010, 114) and Audi (2012a, 693). Other theorists, such as Schaffer (2009, 375-376),
claim that metaphysical grounding takes different types of entities as relata. Other theorists, such as
Correia (2010) and Fine (2012a), express metaphysical grounding claims using sentential operators.
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nation.10 Of course, there is one sense in which I am a “pluralist” about grounding: I
will argue that metaphysical and conceptual grounding are distinct relations. But this
is consistent with the assumption that all cases of metaphysical dependence are unified.
(In this sense, the pluralism I defend differs from the pluralist views of Wilson (2014)
and Koslicki (2015).)
2.2 Conceptual grounding
Metaphysical grounding relates items on different ontological levels; it concerns the struc-
ture of the world. In contrast, conceptual grounding relates items on different semantic
levels; it concerns the meanings of our linguistic expressions. I will assume that concep-
tual grounding takes sentences as its relata.
Just as with metaphysical grounding, instances of conceptual grounding can be ex-
pressed by non-causal in-virtue-of claims:
1′. x is a vixen in virtue of the fact that x is a female fox.
2′. x is a piece of furniture in virtue of the fact that x is a chair.
3′. x is bald in virtue of the fact that x has 20 hairs.
4′. x is an electron in virtue of the fact that x has nomic role R.11
For example, [1′] corresponds to a conceptual grounding relation between the sentences
‘x is a female fox’ and ‘x is a vixen’.12
Intuitively, a sentence A is conceptually grounded by a sentence B when the expres-
sions in B are semantically prior to those in A and the sentence ‘If B, then A’ is a
conceptual truth.13 For the purposes of this paper, it will be fine to rely on examples
10See Trogdon (2013, section 2) for discussion.
11[4′] involves conceptual grounding on the common view that natural kind terms like ‘electron’ refer
to whatever item fills a certain nomic role.
12Note that [1′] is not itself a claim about conceptual grounding; it is claim about non-causal explana-
tion. So, speaking strictly, I will say that [1′] corresponds to a case of conceptual grounding (just as [1]
corresponds to a case of metaphysical grounding). But more colloquially, I will speak of [1′] as a “case”
of conceptual grounding.
13The present analysis imples that ‘x is a female fox and y is a female fox’ conceptually grounds ‘x is
a vixen’. But this is no real concern. We might simply say that some instances of conceptual grounding
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like [1′]-[4′] to provide a working grip on the notion of conceptual grounding, just as
examples [1]-[6] provided a working grip on the notion of metaphysical grounding.
But there are various ways to make the notion of conceptual grounding more precise.
For example, Chalmers (2012, 464-465) develops the idea that certain expressions have
inferential roles that are constitutive of the meanings of those expressions.14 For example,
it is plausible that the term ‘vixen’ is individuated by its obvious inferential links to
‘female’ and ‘fox’.15 With this account, we can say that a term C1 is semantically prior
to a term C2 when the constitutive inferential role for C2 involves C1. We can also say
that the sentence ‘If B, then A’ is a conceptual truth when the constitutive inferential
roles of the terms in A and B provide competent speakers with a warrant for asserting
A on the supposition that B.
Importantly, conceptual grounding does not require that the terms in the conceptu-
ally grounded sentence have explicit definitions. For example, let ¬S be the sentence
‘It is not the case that Smith knows that: either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Barcelona’. Let D be the conjunction of the following sentences:
Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford. Originally, Smith has
no beliefs about Brown’s location. By making a logical inference from his
belief that Jones owns a Ford, Smith forms the belief: Jones owns a Ford
or Brown is in Barcelona. In fact, Jones does not own a Ford. But in fact,
Brown happens to be in Barcelona.
It seems that competent speakers can immediately judge that ¬S is true when presented
with D. The same goes for all other cases in the Gettier literature: the entire progress of
this literature depended on our ability to make these immediate judgments in response
to cases. What can explain our ability to make these judgments? Here’s one plausible
do not correspond to (genuinely explanatory) in-virtue-of claims. Alternatively, we could stipulate as a
further condition that B conceptually grounds A just in case the sentence ‘A in virtue of the fact that
B’ is genuinely explanatory. This choice will not affect the discussion ahead.
14Constitutive inferential roles have been criticized by, e.g., Williamson (2003). I will set these worries
aside.
15By contrast, the term ‘fox’ is not individuated by its inferential links to ‘vixen’.
5
explanation: it is partially constitutive of the meaning of the term ‘knows’ that one is
disposed to judge that ¬S when presented with D (and similarly for other cases). This
suggests that, even if the term ‘knowledge’ cannot be given a definition, there is still a
conceptual link between ‘knowledge’-sentences and sentences describing subjects’ belief
states.
Conceptual grounding is supposed to perform analogous theoretical work to meta-
physical grounding. First: conceptual grounding is needed to underwrite cases of con-
ceptual explanation.16 For example, in order to account for the explanatory force of [1′],
we might say: “what it means for x to be a vixen just is for x to be a female fox”; this
explanation seems semantic, not metaphysical or causal.17 Second, conceptual ground-
ing is needed to accommodate intuitions about semantic priority. For example, even if
‘knowledge’ cannot be given an explicit definition, there is an intuitive sense in which
‘knowledge’-sentences seem semantically derivative from sentences describing beliefs.
To head off any potential confusion, it is worth contrasting the claim that [1′]-[4′]
involve conceptual grounding from two other claims encountered in the literature.
First: conceptual grounding is unrelated to the dispute over whether metaphysical
grounding claims should be expressed using relational predicates or using sentential
operators.18 This is a debate about the logical form of metaphysical dependence claims;
in contrast, conceptual grounding concerns the semantic links between our sentences.
Second: proponents of metaphysical grounding sometimes distinguish “conceptual”
and “worldly” views of facts; these views disagree over whether, e.g., x’s being water and
x’s being H2O are distinct facts.
19 But this is a question about the fine-grainedness of
16For discussion of conceptual explanation, see Schnieder (2006, 405-406).
17To see the difference between semantic explanation and metaphysical explanation, contrast [1′] with
a case like [1]. We would not say that “what it means for there to be chemicals arranged in a certain
way just is for there to be particles arranged in a certain way.”
18See Correia & Schnieder (2012, 3.1) for discussion. Rosen (2010) and Audi (2012b) endorse the
predicate view, while Correia (2010) and Fine (2012a) endorse the operator view.
19Proponents of worldly facts include Correia (2010, 258-259) and Audi (2012b, 3.5). Rosen (2010)
and Fine (2012a) seem to adopt a finer-grained conception of facts.
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the metaphysical grounding relation, not a question about conceptual grounding.20 To
claim that there is conceptual grounding is not to claim that the metaphysical grounding
relation takes conceptual facts (or alternatively: sentences) as its relata.
2.3 Two distinct types of grounding
I have emphasized that metaphysical and conceptual grounding are two distinct relations.
One concerns the metaphysical structure of the world while the other concerns the
meanings of our sentences. One is commonly thought to take worldly entities as its
relata, while the other takes sentences as its relata. In addition, these relations are
posited to perform different types of explanatory work.
Nonetheless, some philosophers might still be skeptical that there are two distinct
relations underwriting non-causal in-virtue-of claims. For example, such a skeptic might
argue that in-virtue-of claims like [1′]-[4′] are merely cases of metaphysical grounding
(and not conceptual grounding). To convince such skeptics, it suffices to give examples
of such claims that do not involve metaphysical grounding. Here is the simplest example
of this type:
5′. x is a bachelor in virtue of the fact that x is an unmarried male.21
As it happens, [5′] is sometimes cited as a case of metaphysical grounding in the litera-
ture.22 But I think that, once conceptual grounding is recognized as a live option, this
view no longer seems attractive. Here is a simple argument to push this intuition.
20For example, Rosen (2010, section 10) endorses a very fine-grained view of facts, but he emphasizes
that metaphysical grounding is not a semantic phenomenon.
21I intend for [5′] to be distinguished from the following case of “conjunctive grounding”: [5∗] ≡ x is
unmarried and male in virtue of the fact that x is unmarried and the fact that x is male. [5∗] is explicitly
distinguished from [5′] in the literature (see, e.g., Chalmers (2012, 454)). This seems appropriate, since
[5∗] and [5′] have different explanatory force: in [5′] the emphasis is on ‘bachelor’, while in [5∗] the is on
‘and’. I claim that, in order to accommodate this distinctive explanatory force, we need to countenance
conceptual grounding. This is true even if someone insists on viewing [5′] as a case of conjunctive
grounding.
22See, e.g., Rosen (2010, 124).
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Suppose a community is just like our community except that they do not possess
the expression ‘bachelor’: they always use the expression ‘unmarried male’. So these
speakers never form the belief that x is a bachelor.23 Do we think these speakers are
missing something about the world’s structure insofar as they lack this belief? Of course
not: these speakers have just as complete a metaphysical picture as we do. We just have
another way of speaking. This suggests that there is nothing metaphysical about [5′].24
(Of course, [5′] isn’t a very interesting case. But for the present, my aim is just to make
the weak point that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are distinct.)
Besides failing to respect our intuitions in the above thought experiment, anyone
who insists on viewing [5′] as involving metaphysical grounding must either reject (a)
the claim that ‘being a bachelor ’ and ‘being an unmarried male’ are just two names
for a single property or (b) the claim that metaphysical grounding is irreflexive.25 But
with conceptual grounding on the table, there is no need to accept either of these con-
sequences.26
Of course, there is nothing stopping us from using ‘metaphysical grounding’ as a
catch-all term that applies in any case of non-causal explanation. But why try to make
room for [5′] under the banner of metaphysical grounding? To insist on grouping these
cases together does not somehow unify them; it merely obscures an important distinction
between two very different phenomena.27
One might wonder: why not just say that conceptual grounding is a form of meta-
23Here, I am assuming a fine-grained categorization of beliefs on which the belief that x is a bachelor
is distinct from the belief that x is an unmarried male.
24Note: this argument stands even on a deflationary account of facts and of the metaphysical grounding
relation. See 4.4.
25For an example of the first response, see Rosen (2010, 124). For discussion of the second response,
see Jenkins (2011, 169).
26This is not to deny that there may be independent reasons to deny (say) the irreflexivity of metaphys-
ical grounding. But philosophers who endorse irreflexivity (e.g., Schaffer (2009, 364)) should welcome
the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical grounding.
27Could this be a verbal dispute? Might theorists who reject (a) or (b) be using the term ‘metaphysical
grounding’ to include cases of conceptual grounding? I think the answer is “no”. For example, Rosen
(2010, section 10) adopts a very fine-grained view of facts, but he explicitly denies that metaphysical
grounding involves semantic links.
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physical grounding that relates facts about sentences? In response: if asked about the
metaphysical grounds of facts involving the sentence ‘x is a bachelor’, we might have
pointed to facts about its constituent expressions, or perhaps facts about our linguistic
practices. But we wouldn’t have said such facts are metaphysically grounded by facts
about another sentence (i.e., ‘x is an unmarried male’). These sentences are certainly
linked, but the link is semantic, not metaphysical.
(None of this is to say that sentences cannot also stand in metaphysical grounding
relations. As I mentioned, it is plausible that facts about sentences are metaphysically
grounded by facts about sub-sentential expressions. So it is best to say that sentences
can be involved in two different types of grounding relations.)
3 The relation between metaphysical and conceptual grounding
In the last section, I argued that conceptual grounding is distinct from metaphysical
grounding. This shows that we need to distinguish which type(s) of grounding are rel-
evant for a given non-causal in-virtue-of claim. In this section, I will consider whether
we can establish any general results about the relation between metaphysical and con-
ceptual grounding. I will first briefly consider a proposal from Chalmers (2012) before
defending an alternative proposal.
3.1 The Conceptual/Metaphysical Thesis
Chalmers (2012, 453) claims that metaphysical and conceptual grounding correspond
over a certain restricted range of cases:
Conceptual/Metaphysical (C/M) Thesis: Suppose an in-virtue-of claim
V involves only super-rigid expressions. Then V involves metaphysical ground-
ing iff it involves conceptual grounding.
9
Roughly, an expression is super-rigid when it takes the same extension across all epis-
temic and metaphysical possibilities. For example, Chalmers suggests that the expres-
sions ‘zero’, ‘wise’, and ‘cause’ are super-rigid (366-369). In contrast, the expression
‘water’ is clearly non-super-rigid (since, on the epistemic possibility that the water-like
liquid in our environment turned out to be XYZ, ‘water’ would have referred to XYZ).
Without the super-rigidity restriction, there would be a clear class of counterexamples
to C/M. For example, consider [4′]: ‘x is an electron in virtue of the fact that x has a
property with nomic role R’. Since ‘is an electron’ expresses whatever property happens
to fill a certain nomic role R, the fact x’s being an electron is plausibly identical to the
fact x’s being a property with nomic role R. So [4′] plausibly involves conceptual but
not metaphysical grounding (see 2.3). Speaking more generally: in-virtue-of claims with
non-super-rigid terms often involve two different ways of describing the same worldly
fact and so do not involve metaphysical grounding.
Because metaphysical grounding is supposed to be independent of our language,
many theorists will immediately worry about counterexamples in the left-to-right direc-
tion: cases of metaphysical grounding without conceptual grounding. For this reason,
Chalmers’ defense of C/M focuses on counterexamples of this sort. But upon reflection,
we see that there are clear counterexamples in the right-to-left direction: cases of con-
ceptual grounding without metaphysical grounding. For example, the bachelor example
from 2.3 is one such case.28
3.2 The Grounding Exclusion Thesis
To exclude cases like [5′], one might try to restrict C/M further. But I think that the
pressures against viewing [5′] as a case of metaphysical grounding actually extend much
more generally. In fact, I will defend the opposite view that conceptual and metaphysical
28This case falls within the scope of C/M because Chalmers (2012) considers ‘bachelor’, ‘unmarried’,
and ‘male’ to be super-rigid terms (453-454). I note that [5′] will be a counterexample to C/M even on
a deflationary conception of metaphysical grounding — see 3.3.
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grounding are exclusive:
Grounding Exclusion (GE) Thesis: If an in-virtue-of claim V involves
conceptual grounding, then V does not involve metaphysical grounding.
(Note: in 2.3, I argued that conceptual grounding is distinct from metaphysical
grounding and is not merely a specific form of the latter. GE, by contrast, is a claim
about the possibility of both grounding relations underwriting the same non-causal in-
virtue-of claim.)
3.3 Preliminary notes
Here are three notes on the arguments for GE that I will present in the next section.
Substantive metaphysical grounding : On the standard view, there are substan-
tive truths to discover about what metaphysically grounds what. On an alternative
deflationary conception, truths about metaphysical grounding are merely conceptual
truths (see Chalmers (2012, 458)). In the arguments ahead, I assume a non-deflationary
conception of metaphysical grounding since this is the most common view in the litera-
ture. I will consider the alternative deflationary conception in 4.4.
Subject-predicate form : In my arguments, I will restrict attention to cases of
conceptual grounding with the form V ≡ ‘x is β in virtue of the fact that x is α’. In
such cases, we can call the property expressed by ‘is β’ a c-grounded property, and we can
call the property expressed by ‘is α’ a c-basic property.29 So, for example, being bald is
c-grounded while having 20 hairs is c-basic (n.b.: one should not read any implications
about metaphysical fundamentality into these terms). This restriction will simplify
presentation since we can focus on cases where, intuitively, the focus is on properties (as
opposed to ontological categories). But later, I will explain why the arguments for GE
are extendable to other cases.
29Of course, conceptual grounding is a relation between sentences, not properties. I introduce this term
just to keep track of the property corresponding to the predicate in a conceptually grounded sentence.
Note that a property’s status as c-grounded will be relative to the in-virtue-of claim under consideration.
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Restrictions: In the arguments ahead, I will appeal to some implicit restrictions on
how we must view the objects and properties involved in metaphysical grounding claims.
In this note, I will explain these restrictions. Focusing on properties first, consider the
following proposed case of metaphysical grounding:
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of the fact that x has shape R
I will use the label “lightweight” to subsume deflationist and (class or predicate) nom-
inalist views of properties. I will now explain why adopting a lightweight view of the
property being roughly spherical is not compatible with viewing [3] as a case of meta-
physical grounding.
(i) Deflationism: According to deflationary theorists, properties are mere “shadows
of predicates”: there is no more to their metaphysical nature than what is correctly
assertible of them in ordinary language.30 In particular, there are no truths to discover
about whether deflationary properties are involved in metaphysical grounding relations.
For this reason, a deflationary view of the property being roughly spherical is incom-
patible with viewing [3] as a case of metaphysical grounding (at least as the relation
is standardly conceived). (For further discussion, see Schaffer (2009, 360), who also
claims that we should reject a deflationary view of the entities involved in grounding
relations.)31
(ii) Class or predicate nominalism: First considering class nominalism, suppose we
identify being roughly spherical with a certain set of individuals {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.32 Then
to say that [3] involves metaphysical grounding is to say that x’s having a certain shape
30Says Schiffer (1996, 159): “there’s nothing more to the nature of properties ... than is determined by
our [property-hypostatizing] linguistic practices. What we can learn about them is what our linguistic
practices license us to learn about them.”
31Some deflationists claim that there is a sense in which properties are derivative from our linguistic
practices (see Schiffer (1996, 161)). So one might adopt a view on which deflationary properties are
metaphysically grounded in our linguistic practices. But even if this is correct, the deflationist will still
deny that x ’s being roughly spherical is metaphysically grounded by x ’s having shape R (which is what
is needed for [3] to involve metaphysical grounding).
32See, e.g., Lewis’ (1983) account of abundant properties.
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R metaphysically grounds x’s being a member of the set {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.33 But this
seems wrong. It isn’t obvious what metaphysically explains facts about x’s membership
in sets, but it certainly isn’t explained by the fact that x has a certain shape. Of course,
the class nominalist can accept some instances of metaphysical grounding; my claim is
merely that someone who views the property being roughly spherical as a mere set will
not view [3] itself as a case of metaphysical grounding. Similar remarks apply to other
“reductive” versions of nominalism.34
I group (i) and (ii) together under the label “lightweight” because of an important
feature they have in common. As I discuss in section 4, proponents claim that we can
trivially establish that lightweight properties are instantiated simply by reflecting on
ordinary language.35 By contrast, on more standard views of properties, establishing
that a property is instantiated is typically thought to require substantive argument.36
For simplicity, we can use the label “heavyweight” as a catch-all term for any property
of this sort (that is: any property not identified with a set, a predicate, or a deflationary
item).37
Notes (i)-(ii) show that the properties involved in metaphysical grounding claims
cannot be lightweight entities. Analogous remarks apply to objects. There are defla-
tionist views of objects, and these views are incompatible with metaphysical grounding
for the same reasons given above. In summary: the properties and objects involved in
cases like [3] cannot be lightweight if we are to view such cases as involving metaphysical
33Since some nominalists do not countenance facts, we should perhaps view the metaphysical grounding
relata in some other way for present purposes. This technicality does not affect the current point.
34For example, suppose properties reduce to predicates. We wouldn’t say that x’s falling under a
certain predicate metaphysically explains the fact that x falls under some other predicate.
35See, e.g., Schiffer (2003, ch. 2)
36See Swoyer (1999) for discussion.
37So, for example, the heavyweight label will subsume views where properties are identified with
tropes, ante rem universals, in re universals, bundles of causal powers, and so on.
It is worth noting that, in addition to lightweight and heavyweight views, one could also endorse
eliminativism. But if the property being roughly spherical doesn’t exist, there are no rough sphericality
facts to be related by metaphysical grounding. So eliminativism is incompatible with viewing [3] as a
case of metaphysical grounding as well. I will set eliminativism aside in the discussion ahead.
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grounding.38 I will appeal to this result in the arguments that follow.
4 Arguments for Grounding Exclusion
Schaffer (2009, 357-358) claims that metaphysics should focus on fundamentality ques-
tions because existence questions are trivial. For example, the following “pleonastic
argument” is said to trivially establish the existence of the property knowing that p:
1*. John knows that p.
2*. John has the property knowing that p. (“pleonastic inference” from 1)
3*. Therefore: the property knowing that p exists. (generalization from 2)
While this style of argument is controversial, I agree with Schaffer that it successfully
establishes the existence of a certain property. But I disagree with Schaffer that the above
argument specifically establishes the existence of a heavyweight property (see Schaffer
(2009, 357-358)). Indeed, a popular view in the literature on properties is that pleonastic
arguments support lightweight views of properties.39 It has been said, for example, that
we can make sense of the trivial inference from (1*) to (2*) if knowing that p is a mere
deflationary item (or a mere set, etc.). But if knowing that p is something more than
this, how could this inference be trivial?
If it is true that pleonastic arguments for an item x support a lightweight view
of x, this might threaten the entire project of metaphysical grounding. This is be-
cause pleonastic arguments are available for many types of items in our ontology, and
lightweight views are incompatible with metaphysical grounding (see 3.3).
But in fact, I think this argument is too quick. This is because certain linguistic
expressions may themselves carry more substantial ontological commitments. For exam-
ple, it is at least plausible that ‘x has spin 1/2’ is only true if x has a certain heavyweight
38Audi (2012a, 708-709) similarly claims that grounded facts must be something “over and above”
grounding facts. While Audi’s focus is on showing that eliminativism is incompatible with metaphysical
grounding, I have argued that deflationism and (class and predicate) nominalism are likewise incompat-
ible.
39See, e.g., Thomasson (2001, 320) and Schiffer (2003, ch. 2).
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microphysical property. If this is right, then the pleonastic inference from this sentence
does not show that having spin 1/2 is lightweight.
Still: even if we set pleonastic arguments aside, I think that there are specific reasons
for thinking that c-grounded properties are lightweight. In the next two sub-sections,
I give two arguments for this claim. The first is a semantic argument: I claim that
names for c-grounded properties refer to lightweight properties. The second is more
metaphysical: I argue for lightweight c-grounded properties directly.
4.1 The triviality argument
I will illustrate the triviality argument by considering the case of [6′]. I will assume
that [6′] involves conceptual grounding, since there is almost certainly a conceptual link
between the sentence F ≡ ‘x has the property having a mass of 2g ’ and the sentence F ′
≡ ‘x has the property having a mass’.
6′. x has a mass in virtue of the fact that x has a mass of 2g.
Let’s grant, as is plausible enough, that x’s property having a mass of 2g is not lightweight
(as is required to view [6′] as a case of metaphysical grounding). What about the prop-
erty having a mass?40 As explained above: if the property having a mass is something
more than a mere set, predicate, or deflationary item, then its instantiation is thought
to require argument.41 But here is the puzzle: within ordinary language, it is trivial to
infer that x has the property having a mass from the fact that x has the property having
a mass of 2g.
This raises an epistemic tension for the theorist who would view [6′] as a case of
metaphysical grounding. Given the triviality of the inference from F to F ′, why would
40N.b.: throughout the discussion, I assume that it is possible for some properties to be lightweight
while others are not.
41See, e.g., Swoyer (1999). I discuss the types of arguments used to establish heavyweight properties
in 4.2.
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we think that the term ‘having a mass’ refers to anything other than a lightweight entity?
A more substantial referent would directly conflict with the epistemology of F ′.42
By contrast, suppose that having a mass is identified with the set of things falling
under the predicate ‘has a mass’. Then there is no puzzle: it is trivial in ordinary
language for a subject who knows that x has a mass of 2g to infer that x is a member
of the set of things falling under the predicate ‘has a mass’. Similar remarks if having a
mass is viewed as a predicate or a deflationary item.
So, in order to be compatible with ordinary epistemology, it is most plausible to
say that ‘having a mass’ refers to some kind of lightweight property. And given the
discussion of 3.3, this in turn suggests that [6′] does not involve metaphysical grounding.
Analogous remarks apply for other c-grounded properties.43
4.2 The explanatory work argument
The second argument also seeks to establish that c-grounded properties are lightweight.
But the emphasis is different: while the triviality argument focused on the semantics
of property terms, the explanatory work argument focuses on c-grounded properties
themselves.
In order to show that there is a heavyweight property P , the standard strategy is to
argue that P is needed to perform certain important explanatory work. It is then argued
that P could not perform this explanatory work if it were a mere lightweight entity. But
42This is not to suggest that any example of a trivial inference suggests conceptual grounding; I clarify
which types of trivial inferences are in tension with metaphysical grounding in 5.1.
43Of course, the current argument assumes that c-grounded properties are trivially inferable from c-
basic properties. While this is true in ordinary cases, it is not true for all c-grounded properties. For
example, we might stipulate that ‘x is tifleron’ is true iff x is composed of more than 40 trillion cells.
Then ‘x is tifleron’ (or ‘x is not tifleron’) is plausibly conceptually grounded by a sentence S describing
the individual positions of all of x’s cells. But because of S’s enormous complexity, it certainly will not
be trivial for a subject to infer ‘x is tifleron’ from S.
But this kind of case is no real concern. The non-triviality in the tifleron case is explained by, e.g.,
our limited memory, our limited computational abilities, and so on. If we idealized away from these
limitations, the inference to ‘x is tifleron’ would be trivial (since it would merely involve exercising our
concepts). But even with such idealizations, only an inference to a lightweight property would be trivial.
So the triviality argument retains its force even in more complex cases.
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in this section, I will argue that this argument fails in the case of c-grounded properties.
The upshot will be that there are no reasons to view c-grounded properties as anything
more than lightweight entities, which will in turn support GE.
Of course, it is outside the scope of this paper to consider all the types of explanatory
work that properties have been posited to perform. For this reason, I have tried to select
examples that are representative of the arguments typically given in the literature.
Truthmaking : Properties are sometimes posited to serve in accounts of the truth-
makers for our sentences.44 For example, it has been claimed that we need to posit
the property of negative charge in order to explain the truth of sentences like ‘X is
negatively charged’. But whatever the status of this argument in general, c-grounded
properties are not needed for truthmaking. Since sentences expressing c-grounded prop-
erties are conceptually entailed by sentences expressing c-basic properties, we only need
the corresponding c-basic properties to have truthmakers for the sentences in question.
Scientific practice : Theorists sometimes argue that c-grounded properties are
needed to account for various aspects of scientific practice. For example, Wilson (2012,
5) notes that determinable properties like being in a low entropy state figure crucially
in scientific explanations.45 Scientists explain the final state of a system by noting that
systems naturally proceed from low entropy to high entropy states. Wilson argues that
we can only make sense of this practice if we posit properties like being in a low entropy
state to serve as the “ontological ground” of this explanation.46
While Wilson’s argument may support the existence of the property being in a low
entropy state, it doesn’t support the claim that this property is anything more than a
lightweight entity. In her argument, the reason Wilson posits determinables is so that
they can serve as the denotations of certain property terms used in scientific theories
44See, e.g., Armstrong (1997).
45While Wilson’s argument is directed at determinables in general, I have chosen a specific example
of such a property (being in a low entropy state) to make her argument concrete.
46Note that, because the sentence ‘X is in a low entropy state’ is plausibly definitionally entailed by
sentences describing the underlying physical state of the system’s component particles, being in a low
entropy state is plausibly a c-grounded property.
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and explanations. But here is the problem: within scientific discourse, ‘being in a low
entropy state’ is a c-grounded property term. And the discussion of 4.1 shows that such
terms refer to lightweight entities. For this reason, a more substantial determinable
property would not be able to perform the explanatory work Wilson intends for it.
Wilson’s argument is just one example of a scientific argument for positing c-grounded
properties. But the response given above will be applicable to any argument in which
c-grounded properties are posited in order to serve as the denotation of property terms
used in scientific theories and explanations.47
Resemblance : Properties are often invoked to explain similarity.48 But even if these
arguments are successful in certain cases, we don’t need c-grounded properties to explain
resemblance. To illustrate this, I will continue with the entropy example from before.
Suppose that X and Y are both in a low entropy state. How do we best explain this
similarity between them? One possible explanation is that X and Y both instantiate
some sui generis property that explains their similarity. But with conceptual grounding,
we have a better explanation. Conceptual grounding suggests that the similarity in virtue
of which we apply the predicate ‘is in a low entropy state’ to both X and Y is a similarity
that is “already present” in the facts described by the more basic sentences (i.e., the
facts about the relative positions of the particles, etc.). In other words, it is because of
a similarity in the c-basic properties of X and Y that we are able to judge to apply ‘is
in a low entropy state’ to both X and Y on the basis of the basic sentences. So we don’t
need to appeal to a c-grounded property to explain this similarity.
Causal powers: Suppose Sophie the pigeon is trained to peck at anything red.
Now suppose Sophie pecks at something scarlet. What causes Sophie’s pecking: the
instance of scarlet or the instance of red? The intuitive answer is supposed to be: the
instance of red (since Sophie would have picked at anything red). So philosophers have
47Of course, this is not to say that all scientifically indispensable properties are c-grounded. I have
only argued that the ones that are c-grounded should not be viewed in a heavyweight way.
48See Swoyer (1999, 107)
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posited c-grounded properties (such as redness) in order to serve as the bearers of causal
powers.49
The response to this argument is the same as the response to Wilson’s argument
above. Notice that the Sophie example relies on our ordinary intuitions about the cause
of the pecking in the described case. In other words: when we judge that redness causes
the pecking, we are employing the ordinary expression ‘redness’. But if redness is a
c-grounded property, then the term ‘redness’ refers to a lightweight entity (see 4.1).
So even if the Sophie case supports the claim that c-grounded properties have causal
powers, it does not support the claim that c-grounded properties are anything more than
lightweight entities.50
In summary: the standard arguments for showing that a property is more than a
mere lightweight entity seem to fail in the case of c-grounded properties. While the
above arguments do not definitively establish this result, they at least put the burden
of proof on the metaphysical grounding theorists invoking such properties to show that
c-grounded properties are something more than mere sets or shadows of predicates.
4.3 Summary
I have given two arguments for the lightweight status of c-grounded properties. Given the
implicit restrictions on properties involved in metaphysical grounding relations (see 3.3),
this supports the GE thesis. (Of course, GE does not imply that there is no metaphysical
grounding at all. It simply claims that in-virtue-of claims involving conceptual grounding
do not also involve metaphysical grounding.)
For ease of presentation, I have focused on in-virtue-of claims with the form ‘x is β
in virtue of the fact that x is α’. But analogous arguments should apply to other cases
as well. For example, Thomasson (2007, 164-165) claims that the sentence ‘There is a
49This argument is from Shoemaker (2001, 78-81). See Swoyer (1999, 107) for relevant discussion.
50This might seem puzzling: how can we make sense of redness having causal powers if they are merely
lightweight? I suspect that we should view the causal powers in some kind of lightweight sense.
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chair’ is conceptually entailed by the sentence ‘There are particles arranged chairwise’.
If she is right, then [7] will be a case of conceptual grounding:
7. There is a chair in virtue of the fact that there are particles arranged
chairwise.
Does [7] also involve metaphysical grounding? Thomasson (2009, 467) appeals to the
triviality of the above inference to argue that items like chairs have no “real metaphysical
nature” for metaphysics to discover (this is just a version of the triviality argument given
in 4.1). But if chairs have no real metaphysical nature to discover, then debates about
whether parts metaphysically ground wholes or wholes metaphysically ground parts are
misguided. So if [7] involves conceptual grounding, then it is not a case of metaphysical
grounding.
4.4 Objections
I will now consider two ways a theorist might resist GE. It is possible to adopt a defla-
tionary stance where truths about metaphysical grounding are mere conceptual truths
(see Chalmers (2012, 458)). So in arguing for GE, a deflationist may object that I’m
trying to deny conceptual truths. My response to this worry is that I intend to use
‘metaphysical grounding’ in the standard, non-deflationary way it is used in the litera-
ture. Typically, theorists who study metaphysical grounding are not deflationists: their
stated goal is to discover substantive truths about metaphysical dependence.
A second way to resist GE would be to claim that c-grounded properties are more
than mere sets or deflationary items, but to insist that their instantiation is trivial
nonetheless. For example, Schaffer (2009, 360) says: “I take entities [involved in ground-
ing claims] to be full-blown “heavyweight” entries on the roster of entities, and merely
add that their existence is obvious”.
But in response, I want to re-emphasize that there is nothing in Schaffer’s arguments
for the trivial existence of (say) properties that suggests that these items are anything
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more than lightweight properties. So anyone who wants to reject GE has the burden
of showing that c-grounded property terms do not refer to mere lightweight entities.
Similar remarks apply to other items in our ontology.
5 Heuristics
If GE is true, it becomes important to distinguish metaphysical and conceptual ground-
ing. Conflating these relations may lead to mistaken conclusions about metaphysical
structure. In this section, I will consider two heuristics for distinguishing each type of
case.
5.1 The Scrutability Heuristic
I will illustrate the scrutability heuristic by considering the following alleged case of
metaphysical grounding:
8. x knows that p in virtue of facts about the causes, evidence, truth, etc.
of x’s belief that p (Fine 2012a, 53)51
In 2.2, I made the following observation: when we are told sufficient information about
a subject’s belief state, we are (across a variety of ordinary cases) able to trivially judge
whether or not that subject has knowledge. With this epistemic result in hand, we can
use inference to the best explanation to support conceptual grounding in the case of [8].
What explains the fact that we can often trivially judge whether x knows that p when
given a description of x’s belief state? If [8] involves conceptual grounding, we have an
elegant explanation: it is constitutive of competence with the term ‘knows’ that one is
disposed to make these judgments. This motivates the following heuristic:
51For ease of presentation, I have adjusted the form of this example.
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Scrutability heuristic: Consider a (genuinely explanatory) in-virtue-of
claim V ≡ ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’. If sentences involving the
same family of vocabulary52 as S1 are trivially inferable from sentences
involving the same family of vocabulary as S2, this is evidence that V
involves conceptual grounding.
So, for example, since ‘knowledge’ sentences are trivially inferable from sentences describ-
ing belief states, the scrutability heuristic suggests that, in fact, [8] involves conceptual
grounding.
It is worth noting that not all trivial inferences suggest conceptual grounding.53
For example, ‘2+2=4’ is trivially inferable from ‘John is tall’, but this is only because
‘2+2=4’ is trivial simpliciter. The restriction to “genuinely explanatory” in-virtue-of
claims helps to exclude such cases. More generally, scrutability evidence should be
viewed as defeasible; conceptual grounding may not not provide the best explanation of
scrutability in all cases.54
5.2 The Vagueness Heuristic
I will illustrate the second heuristic by considering the following alleged case of meta-
physical grounding:
3. x is roughly spherical in virtue of the fact that x has shape R
I will argue that the vagueness of the predicate ‘is roughly spherical’ supports the view
that, in fact, [3] involves conceptual grounding.55
52The intuitive distinctions between “families of vocabulary” will directly mirror the distinctions drawn
between domains of facts in the literature on metaphysical grounding (i.e., the type of distinction drawn
when it is claimed that physical facts metaphysically ground phenomenal facts, etc.).
53Contrariwise, there may be some cases of conceptual grounding that do not involve trivial
inferences—see fn. 43.
54One interesting case to consider is ‘∃xFx in virtue of the fact that Fa’. While ‘∃xFx’ is triv-
ially inferable from ‘Fa’, it is not obvious that conceptual grounding provides the best explanation of
scrutability in this case; for example, some theorists have argued that logical inferences are instead
justified by rational intuitions (see, e.g., Dogramaci (2013)). On the other hand, ‘∃xFx’ and ‘Fa’ may
involve the same family of vocabulary, so perhaps the scrutability heuristic does not apply to this case.
55If [3] is indeed a case of conceptual grounding, it is because the term ‘R’ (which picks out a certain
determinate shape property) is semantically prior to the expression ’is roughly spherical’—see 2.2.
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Suppose that it is indeterminate whether x is roughly spherical when x has par-
ticular shape Ri. On the standard linguistic theory of vagueness, this indeterminacy is
attributable to linguistic imprecision. So to eliminate the indeterminacy, we can stipulate
whether or not the predicate ‘is roughly spherical’ applies to shape Ri. But if whether
Ri counts as roughly spherical merely depends on this type of semantic decision, this
suggests that ‘rough-sphericality’-sentences are conceptually linked to ‘shape’-sentences.
This in turn supports viewing [3] as a case of conceptual grounding, since [3] employs
terms from these two families of vocabulary.
The above argument does not show that all vagueness indicates conceptual ground-
ing. For example, consider [6] ≡ ‘x is in pain in virtue of the fact that x is in brain state
P ’. In both [6] and [3], we have a claim of the form ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’,
with a vague expression in S1. In both cases, we would precisify S1 by stipulating its
truth value in an indeterminate case meeting description C. What separates [6] and [3]
is the vocabulary employed by C. In [3], C (i.e., ‘x has shape Ri’) employs the same
family of vocabulary that S2 employs. This is why our ability to stipulatively settle S1
in the case described by C is relevant to whether [3] involves conceptual grounding.
Contrast this with [6]. The normal way to precisify ‘pain’ would not be to stipulate
which specific brain states count as painful. Instead, we would stipulate which specific
phenomenal states count as painful.56 In other words, in case [6], C would employ
phenomenal vocabulary: terms that pick out conscious states directly in terms of their
intrinsic phenomenal character. But if this is right, then our ability to stipulate the truth
of S2 given description C has no bearing on whether [6] involves conceptual grounding,
since the right side of [6] doesn’t employ phenomenal vocabulary.
Of course, if we know that subjects in a certain borderline pain state are in brain
state Pi, we could precisify ‘is in pain’ by stipulating that Pi is a case of pain. But
56Here, I remain neutral whether physical and phenomenal states are identical. If they are identical,
the present point is that, on the normal way of precisifying ‘is in pain’, we would refer to these states
using phenomenal descriptions, not neuroscientific descriptions.
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this stipulation is only possible if we possess empirical knowledge about the connec-
tions between brain states and conscious states. For this reason, the possibility of such
stipulations doesn’t suggest conceptual grounding in [6].
The above discussion motivates the following heuristic:
Vagueness heuristic: Consider a (genuinely explanatory) in-virtue-of claim
V ≡ ‘S1 in virtue of the fact that S2’. If:
(a) S1 is indeterminate in some situation L due to a vague expression
in S1 and
(b) a subject with no further empirical information could precisify S1
by stipulating its truth when given a description of L that only
employs vocabulary from the same family as in S2,
then this is evidence that V involves conceptual grounding.
For example, in [3], S1 is indeterminate in the situation described by C ≡ ‘x has shape
Ri’. Since a subject can simply stipulate that Ri is roughly spherical without needing
any further empirical information, the vagueness heuristic suggests that [3] involves
conceptual grounding. In contrast, the vagueness in [6] does not suggest conceptual
grounding because of condition (b).
5.3 A test case
I will illustrate the heuristics with the following case:
9. x causes y in virtue of facts about the Humean mosaic and laws of nature.57
There have been many attempts to analyze the term ‘cause’. But every proposal seems
to face counterexamples. These failures have led certain philosophers to suggest that we
reorient our approach to theorizing about causation. Instead of focusing on the term
‘cause’, we should instead focus on the causal relation itself, investigating its patterns of
metaphysical dependence. Here is a representative quotation from Schaffer (2007):
57Schaffer (2007, 873-874) considers this possible example of metaphysical grounding (although he
doesn’t endorse it).
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I suspect that many philosophers have really been interested in a concep-
tual analysis of causation because they thought the issue was of ontological
moment. ... [But the] conceptual order — the order of definitions in our
minds — need not match the ontological order — the order of dependencies
in nature. (873)
But the move from the failure of conceptual analysis to the study of the metaphysical
grounds of causation may be premature. This is because, even if ‘cause’ cannot be
given a definition, there is still strong support for the claim that causal sentences are
conceptually grounded. I will support this claim with the scrutability and vagueness
heuristics.
Scrutability heuristic: The very counterexamples that tell against the analyzabil-
ity of the term ‘cause’ actually support the claim that ‘cause’ stands in trivial inferential
connections to more basic terms. For example, let E be the sentence ‘Suzie’s throw
caused the bottle to shatter’. Let F be the conjunction of the following sentences:
“Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy throws first, or maybe she
throws harder. Her rock arrives first. The bottle shatters. When Billy’s rock
gets to where the bottle used to be, there is nothing there but flying shards of
glass. Without Suzy’s throw, the impact of Billy’s rock on the intact bottle
would have [shattered the bottle]. But, thanks to Suzy’s preempting throw,
that impact never happens.” (Lewis (2004, 82))
It seems that competent speakers can trivially judge that E is true when presented
with F . The same goes for other cases in the literature on causation (e.g., preemption
cases, overdetermination cases, etc.). The entire progress of this literature depended
on our ability to make trivial judgments about what causes what when presented with
descriptions of cases. Taken together, these cases suggest that: when we are told suffi-
cient information about a situation without using the term ‘cause’, we can often trivially
judge whether x causes y.
What explains our ability to make these trivial judgments? With conceptual ground-
ing, we have an elegant explanation: it is constitutive of competence with the term ‘cause’
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that one is disposed to make these judgments.
Vagueness heuristic: There are many cases where we lack firm intuitions about
whether x causes y. For example, let G be the conjunction of the following sentences:
‘Two assassins, Captain and Assistant, are on a mission to kill Victim. Upon spotting
Victim, Captain yells “Fire!”, and Assistant fires. Overhearing the order, Victim ducks
and survives unscathed.’58 In the case described by G, we lack firm intuitions about P
≡ ‘The captain’s yelling “Fire!” caused Victim to survive’.
One might think that there is still an objective fact about the truth of P in this case.
But this can be resisted with a thought experiment. Imagine two communities A and
B that agree with us on almost all of our ordinary causal judgments. But, while we are
undecided about P , A-speakers have robust intuitions that P is true while B-speakers
have robust intuitions that P is false. What should we say about the dispute between
A-speakers and B-speakers over P? It seems most plausible to say that this dispute
is merely verbal: A-speakers and B-speakers simply use the term ‘cause’ in slightly
different ways, such that P is true for A-speakers and false for B-speakers. But if this is
right, it suggests that P is indeterminate on our use of the term ‘cause’. So condition
(a) of the vagueness heuristic is met.
To precisify P , we would simply stipulate its truth given the description G of the case;
no further empirical information would be required. So it is plausible that condition (b)
is also met and that the vagueness heuristic supports viewing [9] as a case of conceptual
grounding.
Summary : Both heuristics suggest that, if [9] involves grounding at all, the ground-
ing in question is conceptual. So metaphysical grounding isn’t the proper methodological
approach for theorizing about causation.
58This example is from Hitchcock (2003, 10), who discusses many similar cases.
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5.4 How widespread is conceptual grounding?
It is outside the scope of this paper to apply the heuristics to further cases. But my own
view is that many other alleged cases of metaphysical grounding are better interpreted
as involving conceptual grounding. Examples I have discussed in this paper include
[3], [8], and [9]. From the original list of examples, I’m inclined to say that [4] and [5]
involve conceptual grounding as well. In contrast, the best candidates for metaphysical
grounding are [1], [6], and perhaps [2]. But these examples are controversial and deserve
fuller discussion.
6 Conclusion: philosophical payoffs
In this paper, I have argued that metaphysical and conceptual grounding are exclusive
and have offered two heuristics to identify which type of grounding is operative in a
given case. I will now mention some payoffs of the above discussion.
First, and most importantly, I have argued that metaphysical grounding is not the
only way to make sense of non-causal in-virtue-of claims. Deflationist and reduction-
ist views can equally well account for cases of non-causal explanation by appealing to
conceptual grounding.
Second, the above discussion shows that before we ask questions of the form ‘Does X
ground Y ?’, we first need to ask: ‘Is there a semantic link between the expressions ‘X’
and ‘Y ’? In answering this question, we find that many alleged cases of metaphysical
grounding actually involve conceptual grounding.
Finally, the above discussion should be of interest to theorists who are skeptical of
metaphysical grounding. One way to object to metaphysical grounding is to challenge
proposed examples of it.59 And with the GE thesis, we have a general strategy for
challenging such cases: use the heuristics to show that a given in-virtue-of claim actually
59See Hofweber (2009) for an example of this strategy. Raven (2012) defends certain alleged examples
of metaphysical grounding.
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involves conceptual grounding. It has been outside the scope of this paper to apply these
heuristics to a wide variety of cases. But my own view is that most proposed cases of
metaphysical grounding are actually cases of conceptual grounding. If this is correct,
the heuristics may help justify skepticism about the notion of metaphysical grounding
itself.
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